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The detection of explosives at airports, land borders and seaports is an important 
area for preventing terrorism and organized crime. It forms one aspect of the 
general effort to prevent the transport of illicit materials, which includes also 
small arms, nuclear material and narcotics. A number of different methods of 
explosive detection have been developed in the past that can detect such material 
from a very small up to a very large quantity. Good, thorough reviews are already 
available (see References [1] – [6] and [24]). This survey is intended to provide a 
brief summary and to explain the role of European legislation and the European 
Commission’s research programs in this field. It describes: 
Techniques of explosive detection that are in use and the latest techniques • 
that are in development.
Characteristics of explosives that are, or might be, used to provide a signature • 
for exploitation in detection technology. Some additional details are given 
concerning plastic and liquid explosives.
Tables of related European Commission funded research projects.• 
A brief account of relevant European trade, safety and security legislation and • 
a description of recent policy initiatives.
For the purposes of border security, checks are performed on passengers; carry-on 
luggage, checked baggage, vehicles and containers. Each detection technique is 
usually focused on either bulk explosives or traces of explosives. Detection of bulk 
explosives is carried out either by imaging characteristics of the explosive device 
or by detection of the explosive itself. Trace detection utilizes either emitted 
vapors from the explosive or explosive particles deposited on surfaces. Because of 
the wide range of energetic materials and the many differences in their physical 
properties, several detection devices detect only certain types of explosives and 
fail to detect others. In Appendix, table 8, physical and chemical properties of 
various common explosives are shown. In figure 23, the vapor pressure of common 
explosive materials is presented. 
The nitro and nitrate component of some common explosives are the base of some 
detection methods, the nitrogen density of common materials and explosives 
are represented in Appendix, fig.22. Many detection devices readily detect 
conventional explosives made of organic nitro and nitrate compounds, but fail to 
detect explosives made of inorganic nitrates or non-nitrogenous compounds. In 
particular, many nitrogen-based detection devices fail to detect explosives such as 
ANFO (ammonium nitrate in fuel oil), and triacetone triperoxide (TATP). (Related 
characteristics of some plastic and liquids explosives are presented below in the 
description of the new threats). 
The original vapor-based explosives detector is, of course, the dog, which is 
very effective for some purposes, but which has some serious “canine factor” 
limitations. Dogs, while very sensitive detectors, have limited attention spans, 
must be integrated as a team with a particular trainer to be most effective (thus 
generating high operating costs), and are often not consistent from day to day. 
They are still the best explosives detectors available for a wide variety of uses, 
1.  introduCtion
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Introduction
such as a sweep of a well-defined area in the wake of a bomb threat.
The methods and the equipment of explosive detection relating to the general use 
of the systems are presented in fig. 1 and fig. 2 below. 
The methods may be categorized in several different ways, such as by context:
Humans;• 
Baggage;• 
Vehicle;• 
Containers.• 
Alternatively, they may be categorized by technique, as indicated in the figures 1 
and 2.
General techniques of detection: (based mainly on source, [2], [4], [5] and [6]).
Trace detection
Vapor/particle
Bulk explosives
R&D methods
Canine
Chemical
Optical
Biosensor
X-ray
Nuclear, Gamma ray
Electromagnetic 
UV, Infra red, Radar
Terahertz
Technology category
Note
Active passive
Bu
lk
X-ray
Gamma Ray
Acoustic
Fast/Thermal Neutron
UV, Infra red, Radar
See table 9 for 
Company and 
Vendor
Tr
ac
e Reflection/ Photo 
acoustic Spectroscopy
Canine
Vapor/Trace  Methods
See table 10 for 
Company and 
Vendor
R&
D Terahertz
Optical (non linear/
DIAL/DIRL)
Biosensor
Electronic nose
MEMS
Table 1: 
Categories of the 
general techniques of 
detection
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Figure 1: 
Explosive 
detection –  
Trace methods 
and equipment
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Figure 2: 
Bulk Methods
and equipment
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Trace Detection Vapor/Particle Techniques
The term “trace detection” refers to detection of very small quantities of explosive, 
much smaller than those in the bomb itself, either in vapor and particulate form, 
defined in [6] as follows: 
Vapor•	  — Gas-phase molecules that are emitted from a solid or liquid explosive. 
The concentration of explosives in the air is related to the vapor pressure of 
the explosives material and to other factors such as the amount of time the 
explosives material is present in a location, its packaging, air circulation in the 
location, etc.
Particulate•	  — Microscopic particles of the solid explosives material that adhere 
to surfaces (i.e., by direct contact with the explosive, or indirectly, through 
contact with someone’s hands who has been handling explosives).
Trace explosive detection systems always perform three operations: sampling, 
selection and detection. Sampling is the collection of material from the object 
or region under investigation and its transport to the instrument. Selection is the 
separation of substances in the sample which could be explosive from those which 
could not be. Detection is the measurement of how many molecules have passed 
the selection process. In general, these operations may be combined together or 
separated into different process steps. 
Performance limits exist on all three operations which lead either to some explosive 
molecules not being counted or to non-explosive molecules being mistakenly 
counted. If one wishes to ensure that no explosive molecules are missed, the price 
to pay is that some non-explosive molecules are included i.e. there is a trade-off 
between selectivity and sensitivity. The instrument designer has some discretion 
over where the balance is struck.
 
The word “detector” is sometime used to denote just the sensor used for the 
detection of the selected molecules and sometimes the overall system. It is 
important to make clear in context which one is referring to.
The most difficult challenge of trace explosives detection is that of sample 
collection and transport to the instrument. Particulate sampling usually requires 
direct contact to remove material from a contaminated surface. Vapor sampling 
requires no contact but is made difficult by the very low vapor pressures of common 
organic-based explosives such as TNT, RDX, and PETN (especially the last two) and 
by the presence of polymeric binders, plasticizers and/or waxes. Fig. 23 in Appendix 
shows values. Confinement and packaging of the explosive may be assumed to 
further reduce the vapor concentration by one order of magnitude in a practical 
detection scenario. For both trace methods, another important difficulty is cross-
contamination of samples, because explosive molecules are highly adsorptive and 
will adhere or stick to nearly all surfaces.
On the other hand, this property can also be used to advantage to concentrate 
2.  traCe deteCtion Vapor/partiCle teChniques
2.1 
Trace deTecTion 
basic operaTions
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explosive material from a large sample. Special matrix materials and coating may 
be used to enhance this process of selective adsorption.
Some explosive detection systems incorporate a pyrolization step: the sample trace 
or vapor is heated strongly enough to decompose it into simple gas molecules, for 
example nitrogen oxides. The detection stage is made to be sensitive to these. In 
this case, the detector will respond to any substance which decomposes to these 
gases on pyrolization. So it is an operation which tends to increase sensitivity and 
decrease selectivity.   
We describe here the techniques in approximate order of technology readiness, 
beginning with those routinely in use and ending with those still in the research 
phase.
Ion mobility spectrometry (IMS) is the most common technique used in commercial 
instruments for trace explosives detection. The attractive features of high speed, 
comparatively low cost, high convenience, strong reliability and sound performance 
of IMS have favored applications in many explosives detection scenarios. IMS 
instruments can operate in particulate and/or vapor modes. Instrument formats 
range from small, hand-held devices to large, dedicated-site portal systems.
IMS detection separates ions by how quickly they drift through a gas. Fig.3 shows a 
typical layout. The sample is delivered to the ionization region of the instrument, 
where negative ions are formed by irradiation. These ions are accelerated by an 
electric field and admitted via a shutter into the drift region, which is usually tube-
shaped and at atmospheric pressure. Focusing electrodes keep the ion beam from 
spreading laterally. As the ions exit from the drift region, they are counted, usually 
by a simple Faraday cup, i.e. the ions collide with a metal plate and deposit 
their charge, which is counted electronically. The time required from the moment 
when the shutter is opened until the ions are registered by the counter is called 
the drift time and is a complex function of the charge, mass, and size of the ion, 
characteristic for each species. Materials are identified as possible explosives if 
their drift time corresponds to that of known explosives.
  Figure 3:
Schematic view
of IMS principle [21] 
2.2 
Techniques
2.2.1 
ion mobiliTy 
specTromeTry
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Ion mobility spectrometry is thus based upon two principles: (1) the ionization 
of sample molecules through gas phase chemical reactions by the transfer of an 
electron or a proton, and (2) the characterization of these ions based upon gas 
phase mobility in a weak electric field. The mass, size, and shape of these ions 
will govern the mobility through a voltage gradient, and this can be measured as 
time required to traverse a fixed distance. Thus IMS detectors yield a drift time or 
mobility value which is characteristic of certain ions (i.e., chemicals) and provide 
specificity of response.
Some instruments have been made which use chemical ionization e.g. with 
methylene chloride but radioactive ionization with Ni63 is usually preferred as 
being simpler and more effective and because the source required is weak enough 
not to present an excessive safety hazard or regulatory burden. 
The drift time is sensitive to pressure and so changes with weather conditions and 
altitude. Little more than routine, periodic recalibration is needed to cope with 
this, but users do need to be aware of the issue.
A drawback of IMS technology is poor peak resolution in mixtures, which real-world 
samples invariably are. Two different materials that form ions of similar size and 
mass may give similar drift times and appear as a single broad peak rather than 
two distinct peaks in an IMS spectrum. To resolve the overlapping peak problem it 
is necessary to separate the molecules on the basis of some other property i.e. to 
provide an additional selection process.
Mass spectrometry (MS) is a selection method based on the charge and mass of ions. 
MS systems consist of an ionization stage followed by arrangement of electrodes 
and/or coils for generating an electromagnetic field designed such that ions with 
different charge to mass ratios will either follow different trajectories through it 
and exit at different places or have different times of flight. The final stage is a 
counter, which can be a Faraday cup but is usually an electron multiplier, a more 
sensitive device employing the avalanche effect.
Figure 4:
Examples of fielded 
IMS Equipment
(Photo furnished by 
Smiths Detection) 
2.2.2  
mass specTromeTry 
(ms) (Gc/ms)
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In contrast to IMS, in MS the separation process occurs in high vacuum. The oldest 
form of MS, called sector MS, uses an accelerating d.c. electric field followed by 
a d.c. magnetic field which bends the ions’ trajectories through the sector of a 
circle, with radius dependent on the charge to mass ratio. Modern systems may use 
other arrangements, including r.f. fields as in, for example, the quadrupole MS, in 
which there are four parallel cylindrical r.f. electrodes arranged in a square.
For a given ion, the charge is an integer and the mass, at least for stable ions, 
is defined to several significant figures, so the charge to mass ratio is a precise 
characteristic. Typically, as well as ionized whole molecules, ionic fragments 
are also found, giving a spectrum characteristic of the substance. With careful 
instrument design, the MS peaks of stable ions can be made very narrow, making 
MS a much more discriminating form of separation than IMS. The engineering 
required, however, is significantly more demanding.
Gas chromatography (GC) is a selection technique based on the degree to which 
gas molecules are adsorbed by a solid. The sample is introduced into a gas 
chromatographic column, which is a narrow tube coated internally with a material 
which binds more strongly with some substances than with others. The sample 
molecules in the column are partitioned in dynamic equilibrium between a mobile 
phase flowing down the column and a stationary phase adsorbed onto the coated 
walls. Substances which are adsorbed more strongly travel down the tube more 
slowly, so the GC resolves a mixture into its components. A suitable detector is 
placed at the end of the column. The time required for each chemical substance to 
travel the length of the GC column, called the retention time, is determined by the 
equilibrium constant. The detector in a GC system can be chosen to be selectively 
sensitive to species of interest, examples used in explosives detection are given 
below. A more sophisticated method is to use the GC to separate a sample prior to 
introduction into an IMS or MS.
To improve upon the IMS trace detection systems currently used, MS is an obvious 
candidate to consider. Most of the currently available GC/MS are laboratory systems 
but portable ones are becoming available. Their weight is around 30kg and their 
throughput about 3 samples per hour. Portable units need about 5 min. but need 
warm up time of 45 mins. They should really be considered substance identifiers 
rather than trace detectors. The cost is 135-215 k$. There needs to be more R&D 
effort to make this method achieve low cost and reasonable throughput.
2.2.3 
Gas chromaToGraphy
Figure 5:
Portable commercial 
GC/MS explosives 
detection systems
(photos furnished by:
Constellation Technol-
ogy Corporation (left) 
and Bruker Daltonics 
(right))
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Chemiluminescence is the production and emission of light that occurs as a product 
of a chemical reaction(s) according to the scheme
 A + B  —> products + light 
Most common explosives materials contain nitrogen (N) in the form of either 
nitro (NO2) or nitrate (NO3) groups. Additionally, most explosive material taggants 
used in plastic explosives also contain NO2 groups. The most commonly used 
chemiluminescence reaction scheme for explosives detection involves infrared 
radiation (IR) light emission from excited-state nitrogen compounds. The produced 
IR light is directly proportional to the amount of NO present, which is related to the 
amount of the original nitrogen-containing explosive material that was present.
CL discussion
One common CL technique is 
to pyrolyze the vapor from the 
sample and react with ozone. If 
nitro groups are present, then a 
reaction between the ozone and 
nitric oxide NO takes place which 
produces an excited, metastable 
state of nitrogen dioxide NO2*. 
On return to its ground state NO2, 
it emits near-infrared light of 
1200nm wavelength, which can 
be detected with a photodiode 
or other suitable semiconductor 
sensor. Since nitrogen-containing 
molecules found in fertilizers, 
some perfumes and other 
common materials may cause the 
same reaction, chemiluminscent 
detectors typically are not used 
alone but are fitted with a front-
end chromatograph column (GC). 
The combined GC/CL provides 
a unique GC retention time and 
separates materials prior to their 
CL detection.
A significant weakness of O3/NO  reaction detectors is their inability to detect 
explosives that are not nitro-based. The Scintrex EVD 3500 (Fig. 6, top) employs 
an alternative chemiluminescent detection technique, reaction with luminol, a 
chemical which photoluminesces in the present of certain oxidizers. This method 
reveals peroxide-based explosives as well as nitro-based.
The electron capture detector (ECD) is a counter suitable for good electron 
acceptors, such as are present in many explosives. 63Ni is a radioactive isotope 
which emits electrons.  As the sample passes over the 63Ni, it will pick up these 
“loose” electrons if it has an electronegative functional group,  The detector sees 
the loss of electrons (a loss of current), and interprets it as a peak. This detector is 
2.2.4  
chemiluminescence 
(cl) 
Figure 6:
Chemiluminescence 
explosive detec-
tion systems (Photo 
furnished by Scintrex 
Trace Corporation and 
by Thermo Electron 
Corporation)
2.2.5  
elecTron capTure 
deTecTor
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very sensitive to halogenated 
compounds, as well as 
compounds with very 
electronegative functional 
groups such as nitro groups 
and peroxides.  The detection 
limit of this detector for 
halogenated compounds can 
be as low as the picograms 
level.  This detector cannot 
detect compounds such as 
hydrocarbons, amines, and 
alcohols.
An example of a current 
MS development system 
is described in [4]. Nine 
n i t r o g e n - c o n t a i n i n g 
explosives (EGDN, DMDB, NG, PETN, RDX, HMX, NT, DNT, and TNT) can be 
confirmed at subnanomole amounts using methylene chloride chemical ionization 
and detection of negative ions. (This is nearly the same ion source chemistry as is 
used in IMS, for those versions which do not use a radioactive source.) The time for 
analysis was less than 10 minutes. 
The electron accepting properties of nitro groups are also the basis of electrochemical 
detectors. The sample is introduced into a cell with electrodes made from 
different materials which are chosen so that an electron-accepting substance will 
draw electrons preferentially from one, the cathode, causing a voltage change 
between it and the other, the anode. 
A reference electrode may also be 
used.
Thermo-redox (Figure 8) is a 
proprietary technique incorporating 
selective adsorption, pyrolization and 
electrochemical detection.
Surface acoustic wave (SAW) devices are piezo-electric crystals with characteristic 
acoustic resonant frequencies. They can be used as chemical detectors because, 
when molecules from a sample are adsorbed onto the crystal surface, the resonant 
frequency is changed. Adsorption is usually greater at lower temperatures so, in 
each detection cycle the crystal is first heated to purge it and then cooled to 
arm it for detection. SAW detectors 
will respond to any molecule which is 
adsorbed onto the surface, they are 
not inherently selective. For explosive 
detection, they are usually employed 
with a GC front-end but selectivity 
can also be introduced by a special 
coating.
Figure 7:
Electron capture de-
tector principle [27].
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Figure 8:
Hand-held commercial 
thermo-redox explo-
sives detection system 
from Scintrex Trace 
Corporation, EVD-3000 
2.2.6 
elecTrochemical
deTecTors and
Thermo-redox
2.2.7 
surface acousTic 
wave deTecTor
Figure 9:
Portable commercial GC/
SAW explosives detection 
system from Electronic 
Sensor Technology (Photo 
furnished by Electronic 
Sensor Technology)
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UV fluorescence is a technique currently under development in which trace amounts 
of explosives materials fluoresce when UV light illuminates the explosives material. 
A portable trace explosives detection system based on UV fluorescence released by 
CDEX Inc. has been developed called the Personal Security Screening System (PS3). 
The PS3 is designed for handheld scanning of people and their personal effects, using 
a wand connected via fiber optic cables to a UV source and detector, to identify 
presence of trace explosives (e.g., RDX, C4, Semtex, TATP, and TNT) and other 
substances on surfaces impacted by the UV energy. Target areas are scanned to detect 
explosives, and to detect drugs such as Cocaine and Heroin. The output of visual and 
audible alerts requires no operator interpretation of positive or negative indications. 
The rechargeable batteries would have an operating time of four to six hours, and 
be capable of easy replacement while in the field. Such equipment is the forerunner 
technology for a mobile personnel portal for rapid screening of individuals.
A promising technology under investigation today is in the area of micromachined 
cantilevers. Tiny micro cantilevers are coated with polymers that can adsorb 
various chemicals. As the chemicals are collected the microcantilever’s mass 
properties change and these changes are detected with optical and electrical 
measurements. The importance of this technology is that it provides sensitivity 
much greater than that of sniffing dogs and can detect a wide range of organic and 
inorganic chemicals. 
Only a few classes of explosives have sufficient vapor pressure to permit detection 
of gas clouds from afar. Instead, most are detected from trace samples obtained 
by swabbing the suspected area, followed by mass-spectrographic or gas-
chromatographic detection.
The stand-off detection of explosives is being pursued. Some of the more promising 
techniques include work on remote Raman LIDAR (light detection and ranging, the 
visible-band analogue of radar)  for detection of RDX explosive samples, remote 
LIBS (laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy) for detection of TNT solid samples, 
DIAL sensing (differential absorption LIDAR) of selected explosive vapors, and CARS 
(coherent anti-Stokes Raman spectroscopy) detection of remote samples.
In some of these cases, new types of lasers (such as room temperature tunable 
quantum cascade lasers and mid-IR pulsed lasers) will greatly enhance the 
detection capability. Most of these techniques are being developed as part of a 
larger combined effort using sensor fusion.
Other research is being pursued to detect chemicals related to the manufacturing 
of the explosive. 
Also, millimeter radar imaging can, in some cases, detect hidden packages under 
clothes when coupled with video tracking, but further testing is required to 
determine the overall false alarm rate and utility.
Non-explosive canine training aids have been developed and field-tested at several 
major airports. Previously, actual explosives were required to perform maintenance 
training of canines in the field. This caused difficulties with the transport and 
storage of the explosives and reduced the frequency of training. 
2.2.9  
research in microma-
chined canTilevers
2.2.10  
research in opTi-
cally-based meThods 
for vapor deTecTion
2.2.11  
canine sTimulanTs 
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This project demonstrated that the use of non-explosive odor replicates does not 
diminish a canine’s ability to detect explosives. These training aids provide a means 
to augment existing canine training scenarios where the use of real explosives is 
impractical. 
Immunological and enzyme detection methods offer the possibility of excellent 
sensitivity and selectivity [1], [24]. It is possible to make antibodies which are 
specific to TNT or other explosive molecules which, for example, can be bound onto 
the substrate of a micromechanical sensor, such as a cantilever. Antibodies leave 
the substrate in the presence of the explosive, changing its resonant frequency 
[25].  Enzymes which participate in bioluminescent or color changing reactions can 
be modified to react with or bind to explosive molecules in such a way that the 
presence of the explosive causes a visible change. This type of reaction may be 
used as the basis of electronic biosensors or test papers or fluids. Enzyme linked 
immunosorbent assay (ELISA) is a hybrid technique which uses a visible change 
from an enzyme reaction to detect the concentration of specific antibodies. In 
ELISA, both the antibodies and the enzyme conjugate are made specific to the 
molecule to be detected.
2.2.12 
biochemical meThods
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3.1 
x-ray and Gamma ray 
Techniques
Bulk explosive detection techniques
Bulk explosive detection systems are designed to detect macroscopic masses of 
explosive, large enough to be visible to the eye, by means of their interaction with 
some form of penetrating field or radiation. The explosive material is distinguished 
from its surroundings by its absorption, backscatter, fluorescence, resonance etc. 
Most bulk detection systems aim to reveal chemical characteristics, such as the 
atomic number of the elements present, which may not be unique to explosives 
but provide a strong indication of their presence. Bulk detection instruments often 
produce images of the inspected item, a suspect bomb being revealed by its shape, 
as well as its chemistry.
The commercially available bulk detection techniques include the following:
X-Ray• 
Gamma-Ray • 
Non-ionizing electromagnetic• 
Neutron• 
The same trade-off between false alarms and false negatives applies as with trace 
detection systems: to be sure to keep the probability of false negatives acceptably 
small, some false alarms must be tolerated. Good statistical performance has 
traditionally depended on well-trained operators, although the image-quality 
of modern systems can be good enough to allow automatic screening e.g. of 
luggage.                    
Gamma rays and X rays, like microwaves and visible light, are part of the 
electromagnetic spectrum. X rays are high-energy radiation and are slightly lower 
in energy than gamma rays and they differ in their origin. Gamma rays originate in 
an atom’s nucleus, and are produced by radioactivity. X rays originate outside an 
atom’s nucleus in the area where the electrons reside.   Both gamma rays and 
X rays pose safety hazards.
When X rays and gamma rays encounter matter, three outcomes are possible. They 
may
pass through the material (transmission), • 
be absorbed (absorption), or • 
be deflected off of its original course (scattered or backscattered.) • 
The main parameter that determination the outcome:  energy use and bulk 
characteristic as:  density, absorption coefficient, backscatter coefficient, and Z 
number.
3.  bulk explosiVe deteCtion teChniques
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3.1.1 
sinGle enerGy 
Bulk explosive detection techniques
The main X-ray technologies currently available:
Single energy • 
Dual energy • 
Computed tomography (CT) • 
Backscatter (including a personnel screening technique) • 
Fluoroscopy • 
Single-energy imagers are the simplest kind 
of X-ray system. Strictly speaking, they are 
not explosive detection systems because the 
image just shows the degree of absorption of 
the X-rays, which is not specific to explosives, 
but they can reveal the presence of explosive 
devices by showing fuzes, wires etc. 
Although today regarded as less than state-
of-the-art, they can still be a valid, low-cost 
security measure in contexts where more 
elaborate solutions would not be justified. 
Cargo and vehicle screening systems which 
require a very high-energy X-ray beam to 
penetrate metal panels are often single-
energy.
The two basic types of dual-energy systems utilize:  a single broadband X ray beam and a 
dual detector arrangement, or separate low-energy X-ray and high-energy X ray beams. 
X-ray data are obtained at both X ray energies. The two independent images are 
computer-processed to compare low-energy to high-energy X ray absorption. The 
displayed results characterize and identify the various materials by their shape, 
and artificial colors are assigned to different Z-numbered materials. The system 
uses color to separate items in the image into organic (low Z number) and inorganic 
materials (high Z number.) The resulting image is displayed on a monitor for visual 
identification. 
Figure 10:
Commercially avail-
able single-energy 
X-ray baggage and 
parcel inspection sys-
tem (Photo furnished 
by Rapiscan Systems 
who also manufacture 
dual-energy instru-
ments.).
3.1.2 
dual enerGy 
Figure 11:
Commercially avail-
able dual-energy 
system & image, with 
the area of concern, 
marked with a red 
frame (Photo furnished 
by L3 Communications, 
Security and Detection 
Systems)
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3.1.3 
backscaTTerSystems produce an image from X-rays that are scattered back from the screened 
object towards the source (not only transmitted as in the standard machines 
described above). Because low-Z materials are more efficient at scattering X-rays, 
explosive-like materials are more contrasted – they stand out clearly – in the 
backscatter image, while they often are barely visible in the transmitted image 
(low contrast). The backscatter image is indeed usually most effective for the 
detection of low-Z materials such as explosives, while the transmission image is most 
useful for viewing metals. Backscatter systems can display both the backscatter 
and transmission images. Quantitatively, a measure of the backscattered X-rays 
together with the standard absorption measurement provides information which 
can help in separating the effects of density and effective atomic number Zeff, in 
order to identify high density, low Zeff  materials (the signature of explosives).
 
X-ray fluores-
cence is a more 
sophisticated 
form of back-
scatter in which 
the elements 
present are 
recognized by 
their emission 
of secondary 
X-rays at 
c h a r a c - 
t e r i s t i c 
f r e q u e n c i e s 
[26].
CT is an even more sophisticated X-ray technique in which cross-sectional images 
(“slices”) through an object are numerically reconstructed from X-ray projections 
at various angles around the object. These cross-sectional images can be added 
together to produce a three dimensional image (as in medical CAT scans). Along 
with the three-dimensional image, the effective Z number is calculated and 
materials with the same Z number as explosives can be identified.
Discussion of X-ray systems [6]
Advantages of dual-energy X-ray systems are:
material discrimination based on shape, the ability to detect metals and other 
high Z number materials in addition 
to explosives, low cost systems are 
available.
The disadvantages of dual-energy 
X-ray systems are: it can be difficult to 
separate objects from one another in 
an image, especially when the object 
does not strongly interact with X-rays; 
the dual-energy technique does not 
determine a material’s thickness, 
therefore, it cannot unambiguously 
determine the Z number of a 
material. 
Figure 13:
Commercial CT system 
(photo furnished by 
InVision technologies)
Transmission Backscatter
Figure 12:
Dual energy image 
of a briefcase on left 
shows a PDA and lap-
top power cord. The 
backscatter image of 
the same briefcase on 
the right shows that it 
also contains a Glock 
handgun and plastic 
and liquid explosives. 
(Photo furnished by 
A S &  E)
3.1.4 
compuTed
TomoGraphy (cT)
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Low cost baggage screening system costs start at only $25,000 and automated 
baggage screening systems cost up to $300,000. Cargo screening system costs 
vary greatly depending on X-ray strength and penetration, but systems cost from 
$60,000 to $900,000
Some low energy X-ray backscatter systems exist for screening people and finding 
explosives, arms and contraband hidden on their bodies, for example those 
made by A. S. & E. and Rapiscan. The technology must achieve adequate image 
quality at a radiation level low enough to comply with statutory or recommended 
exposure limits. Fig. 14 shows an image from the A. S. & E. SmartCheck system, 
which is stated by the manufacturer to give a dose of less than 0.1μSv per scan, 
well within National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements and ANSI 
recommendations, even for frequent travellers, pregnant women and children. 
The scan has to be made twice, front and back, in order to be sure that there are 
no hidden objects on the body, because the radiation goes through clothing but not 
right through the human body like a medical X-ray. The images in Fig. 15 show a 
subject’s body in outline form, to avoid the privacy objection to displaying a nude 
figure.
X-rays passing through a material are scattered from each atom. In a crystal, atoms 
are arranged in a repeating pattern called a lattice. Scattering of X-rays from many 
atoms at equivalent positions in the lattice causes the formation of a pattern of 
dots called a Laue pattern from which it is possible to infer information about the 
structure of the lattice and the spacing between the atoms. 
When XRD is applied for security purposes [3], the object to be inspected is not 
a pure crystal, so the diffraction pattern is blurred into a continuous function of 
angle. Typically, the sample is irradiated with a range of energies and a plot is 
made of scattered intensity as a function of momentum transfer, at fixed scattering 
angle. The curves obtained are characteristic of particular substances. Higher 
energy X-rays are needed to penetrate the object than are used in classical XRD, 
e.g. 150keV. Remarkably, the technique can to some extent work even for liquids.
X-ray diffraction imaging (XRI) is the most advanced form of XRD. Directly by 
collimation and/or indirectly by computerized tomography, the X-ray beam is 
Figure 14:
Low-dose backscatter 
X-ray image of a fully 
clothed man displays 
hidden organic and 
inorganic materials 
(Photo furnished by 
AS&E)
Figure 15:
Silhouette presenta-
tion for enhanced 
privacy 
(Photo furnished by 
AS&E)
3.15 
x-ray diffracTion 
(xrd) and x-ray 
diffracTion imaGinG 
(xdi)
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focused on a limited region of the object, enabling a spatial map of the scattering 
curve to be produced. In its most general form the image is 4-dimensional, with 
three spatial coordinates and a momentum transfer coordinate. 
A number of techniques are available for detection of explosives which employ 
much lower frequency electromagnetic fields which have resonances with atoms 
found in the material which it is required to detect, but which are incapable 
of ionizing atoms. This type of field does not present the same safety hazard as 
ionizing radiation, such as X rays and gamma rays.  
Nuclear quadrupole resonance (NQR) is an explosives detection method 
based on detection of the nitrogen 14 nucleus by means of its electric 
quadrupole moment  i.e. a distribution of electric charge with negative 
charge nearer the centre of the nucleus and positive charge towards the sides; 
 
 
The 14N nucleus has a relatively large 
quadrupole, making it suitable for 
detection by this method. Each nitrogen 
atom acquires a small additional energy 
as a result of its quadrupole aligning 
with local gradients in electric field in 
the molecule. When quadrupole nuclei 
are exposed to a pulsed radio frequency 
(RF) field at the resonant frequency, 
they move to a higher energy state. 
Upon removal of the RF field, the nuclei 
return to their original lower energy 
state, the excess energy is released and a weak RF return signal may be detected. 
The 14N nucleus also possesses a magnetic dipole so that the ensemble of nuclei 
may be excited, and changes detected, by means of a simple coil antenna. 
Discussion of NQR 
The internal electric field gradients are a characteristic of the material, and hence 
each material has characteristic resonance frequencies, so NQR can be used to 
detect different chemical species. The released energy, and the frequency of the 
resonance, is characteristic not only of the isotope and the chemical formula but 
also the molecular and crystal structures. NQR is sometimes referred to simply as 
quadrupole resonance (QR). NQR advantages are: no ionizing radiation source is 
used, it is highly specific for the identification of explosive compounds, there is little 
interference from other nitrogen-containing materials that may also be present, it 
has very low false alarm rate and the probability of detection for a given explosive 
mass is shape independent for NQR. Disadvantages of NQR include the following: it 
is susceptible to shielding (notably metal shielding.)  Not all types of explosives can 
be detected, only those that contain nitrogen.  It requires proximity of the object 
to the RF field source. Thus, the primary application of this technology has been 
the screening of relatively small items such as mail, small packages, and baggage. 
Because metal shielding can make an explosive invisible to NQR, this technique 
needs to be used in combination with another complementary technique.  
Figure 16:
Nuclear quadrupole 
resonance luggage 
inspection system 
(Photo furnished by 
GE Security)
3.2 
non-ionizinG
elecTromaGneTic field 
based meThods
3.2.1 
nuclear quadrupole 
resonance
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Nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) is a technique that has not yet been widely 
utilized in the detection of explosives but is very well-known for other applications. 
NMR is similar to NQR except that in NMR the energy level splitting is due to an 
externally applied magnetic field, which interacts with the magnetic dipole of the 
nucleus. In NMR the resonant frequency is defined mainly by the isotope and the 
strength of the applied field but there is a subtle shift caused by the molecular 
environment i.e. the material’s chemistry. This contrasts with NQR, where the 
resonant frequencies can be completely different for the same isotope in different 
materials.
Pulsed NMR to examine H-N coupling via T1/T2 measurements.
Two parameters have a particular importance, T1 and T2. T1 is the so-called
spin-lattice relaxation time, which is the characteristic time for a nuclear spin 
system to come to equilibrium with its surroundings after a disturbance (such as 
the previously mentioned RF pulses, or a change in the applied field). T1 sets the 
time required to detect an NMR response, and the rate at which NMR tests might 
be repeated without signal degradation. T2 is the so-called spin-spin relaxation 
time, which is the characteristic time for a spin system to come to transversal 
equilibrium following a disturbance i.e. for the distribution of spin-components 
orthogonal to the applied magnetic field to reach thermal equilibrium. The 
transient, free induction decay (FID) signal following a single transmitter pulse 
decreases in amplitude at a rate which is dependent upon T2 (in a homogenous 
magnetic field). T1 and T2 are characteristic of the molecular structure and the 
state of the sample material. Measurements have been reported, in particular at 
a frequency of 3 MHz, showing that these two constants for explosives are well-
separated from those for other common materials of interest, T1 being long (1-10 
sec) and T2 short (10–4- 10–6 sec)
Comparison of NMR and NQR
The requirement of a strong homogeneous auxiliary magnetic field is a disadvantage 
by comparison with NQR. Even though the resonance frequencies in NQR are low 
and hence the technique is a less sensitive technique than NMR, nonetheless, NQR 
has been demonstrated to be useful in practice for explosives detection. While 
NMR in the laboratory using different atoms is an excellent analytical technique, 
in practice for finding explosives in the field it is the hydrogen NMR signal that is 
obtained. The hydrogen in most explosives exhibits very long T1 and very short T2 
NMR relaxation times, and so the explosive can be distinguished from most other 
benign materials. These magnetic resonance techniques require close proximity 
(<1 m) to a large amount (>10 g) of bulk explosive. This limit makes magnetic 
resonance techniques ill suited to standoff detection.
Electron Paramagnetic Resonance (EPR), often called Electron Spin Resonance 
(ESR), is similar to (NMR) but works with the electron spins rather than the nuclear 
spins. Electromagnetic radiation (usually of microwave frequency) is absorbed by 
molecules, ions, or atoms possessing electrons with unpaired spins,
i.e. electronic spin S > 0. 
Electromagnetic radiation at certain frequencies of the order of terahertz (1015Hz) 
is less attenuated by the atmosphere than frequencies a little higher or lower: 
transmission “windows” are said to exist in the terahertz band, making it attractive 
for stand-off detection systems. An example of recent research in this field is 
given in [17]. Portable standoff imaging system definition was carried out, and a 
3.2.3
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3.2.5  
man porTable passive 
millimeTer wave
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comparison of general imaging system performance for several basic imaging system 
designs was completed and detailed, tabulated analysis of standoff imaging system 
performance was carried for a system based on the ultra-sensitive heterodyne 
detection technique, wherein both the transmitter and the local oscillator in the 
receiver utilize terahertz quantum cascade lasers. Such lasers have demonstrated 
power levels adequate for the proposed system. This standoff detection system 
appears to be the most promising for detection of hidden weapons and explosives 
on individuals at standoff distances.
Measurements of terahertz radiation over the 0.3 – 4.0 THz spectral range were 
carried out at sea-level for RH values ranging from 5 % to 58 %.
Five transmission windows occurred in the spectral regions between 3.39 – 3.47 
THz, 2.51 – 2.55 THz, 2.09 – 2.12 THz, 1.96 – 2.0 THz, and 1.47 – 1.56 THz. 
The 1.5 THz design, which involved a 1 cm x 1 cm target imaging resolution (pixel 
size) at a target distance of 50 m, does not provide adequate system sensitivity 
at normal atmospheric humidity levels. Since moderate to high atmospheric 
humidity levels must realistically be dealt with, two possible tradeoffs were 
investigated. Reducing either imaging resolution or operational target distance 
results in improved system sensitivity. A reduction in imaging resolution from 1 cm 
x 1 cm to 10 cm x 10 cm, results in acceptable sensitivity at 50 m target distances, 
whereas maintaining the 1 cm x 1 cm image resolution results in the achievement 
of adequate sensitivity at distances of about 10 m. Intermediate target resolution/
target distance combinations could also provide adequate system sensitivity. 
Prototype standoff personnel screening system are being developed based on 
passive millimeter wave technology. This technology is an adaptation of prior 
development work in the area of obstacle avoidance. Imaging capabilities will 
be enhanced to resolve threat objects concealed beneath clothes at a specified 
standoff distance.
Some will use focal plane imaging and will operate in frequencies of 80-100 GHz 
passive, which provides good clothing penetration with a reasonable size for 
resolution and standoff. A demonstration system by Lockheed Martin [18] has been 
operated at 5m standoff. Pharad Inc. have built a system using wideband MMW 
signals in the Ka- band (26-40 GHz) to excite natural resonances in concealed 
weapons. A sensor module transmits a wideband MMW signal and excites the 
natural resonances of the selected target. A MMW receiver senses the scattered 
radiation due to the natural resonances and extracts the signature of the weapon 
and compares it to a set of database.
Systems based on neutron physics and neutron-excited gamma spectroscopy use 
penetrating neutron radiation which interacts with certain nuclei in such a way as 
to give the possibility of determining the elemental densities or elemental ratios 
of those elements. These include several important light elements, such as carbon, 
oxygen and nitrogen.
                                       
Explosives have unique nuclear signatures as shown in Table 2  and ref. [14] and 
[11].  (The same basic reactions are also of interest for detection or identification of 
narcotics [11] ).
3.3 
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Neutron scanning technologies include several methods, distinguished by the 
source and the neutron energy used for detection:
    a) Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) 
    b) Fast Neutron Analysis (FNA)
    c) Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis (PFNA)
    d) Pulsed Fast Thermal Neutron Analysis (PFTNA)
In these technologies, the neutrons create gamma-ray signals when they interact 
with the elemental ingredients of the inspected object. The gamma-ray energies 
are unique to the elements in the inspected object. If the gamma-ray signatures 
match those in a threat database, the system automatically alarms. 
 
Table 2: 
Nuclear reactions of 
interest for the detec-
tion/identification of 
explosives [14]
Table 3: 
Elemental densities 
and ratios of three 
classes of substances. 
[15]
Figure 17:
Two-dimensional 
representation of el-
emental compositions 
of explosives, drugs, 
and benign substanc-
es in terms of the 
normalized number 
densities of oxygen 
nitrogen [11]
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PFNA can generate three-dimensional, characteristic gamma-ray maps and is able 
to detect explosives and drugs hidden in vehicles and in large cargo containers. 
However, it also has a number of practical limitations, including large size and 
weight, the need for radiation shielding, difficulty in penetrating hydrogenous 
materials, and regulatory and safety issues associated with nuclear-based 
technologies.
The neutrons used in a thermal neutron activation system are provided by either 
a radioactive isotope or by an electronic neutron generator. An electronic neutron 
generator adds cost and experimental complexity to the system, but it has a safety 
advantage over a radioactive source in that the stream of neutrons can be turned 
on and off, thus reducing radiation exposure concerns. 
The advantages of thermal neutron activation are:
Wide variety of applications. The • 
penetrating nature of both the 
neutrons and the emitted gamma 
rays, which readily pass through 
most common materials (including 
metal), can be used in a wide variety 
of explosives detection applications 
including: 
vehicle screening, • 
small cargo screening, • 
baggage inspection, and • 
detection of unexploded • 
ordnance. 
High accuracy and low false alarm • 
rate.
Some of the disadvantages of thermal 
neutron activation are: 
Figure 18:
Pulse neutron genera-
tor time sequence
Figure 19:
Example of a commer-
cially available TNA  
systems (Rapiscan 
Systems)
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Not suitable for personnel screening. Exposure to neutrons can have • 
unacceptable health consequences.
Not suitable for inspection of large cargo containers due to the technique’s • 
use of low- energy neutrons. 
General radiation exposure concerns. • 
Thermal neutron analysis does not detect all kinds of explosive materials. • 
High cost: • 
baggage screening cost is approximately $150,000 • 
cargo screening cost is approximately $1,300,000 • 
Nitrogen-containing, non-explosive materials may set off alarms. • 
Fast neutron activation is a bulk detection technique in which an item or area 
to be screened for explosives is exposed to a high-energy stream of neutrons. 
The fast neutron interacts with the nucleus of matter under inspection and the 
neutron is absorbed and results in the emission of a high-energy gamma ray. Gamma 
ray emission occurs for carbon, nitrogen and oxygen. The technique is able to 
determine the type of substance under analysis. The neutron source used in a fast 
neutron activation system is provided by an electronic neutron generator and, as 
mentioned above, the neutron generator adds cost and experimental complexity 
to the system, but it has a safety advantage in that the stream of neutrons can be 
turned on and off, thus reducing radiation exposure concerns. 
Use of a neutron generator also allows the instrument to function in pulsed mode, 
called pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA). With very short, nanosecond, pulses, it 
is possible to use time of flight information to locate the material.
Advantages of pulsed fast neutron activation are:
Information is gathered on elements besides nitrogen, such as carbon and • 
oxygen, which helps in explosives-like material determination. 
This technique has good neutron penetration and can be used on large cargo • 
containers.  Three-dimensional location information can be determined in the 
object of concern.
Disadvantages of pulsed fast neutron activation systems are: 
System complexity and high cost: a fixed location vehicle system costs over • 
$5,000,000. 
Radiation and shielding concerns. • 
3.3.1
fasT neuTron
acTivaTion (fna)
Figure 20: 
A monitor display 
showing an alarmed 
vehicle (Rapiscan Sys-
tems: thermal neutron 
activation “TNA®” 
and fast neutron acti-
vation system).
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Bulk explosive detection techniques
Pulsed neutron-based technique uses both fast neutron and thermal neutrons. 
Neutrons are pulsed at the nuclei of interest and characteristic gamma ray emission 
is collected. Pulsed fast/thermal neutron activation yields information on several 
elements including carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen. 
Advantages of pulsed fast/thermal neutron activation are: 
Information is gathered on elements besides nitrogen, such as carbon and • 
oxygen, aiding in the determination of explosives-like material.
Disadvantages of are                                                                                                               
System complexity, radiation and shielding concerns;• 
No location information is obtained;• 
Cost— the systems are more complex than the PFNA and need more complex • 
detectors and image processing system.
The atomic ratio by itself is not a very reliable indicator of the presence of 
explosive, since a wide variety of explosives are in use (see section 5), including 
some which contain no nitrogen. In a security application such as baggage inspection 
the neutron beam interacts with the many different substances present and the 
indicated atomic ratios reflect this, making it hard to interpret. All of these neutron 
methods could be improved in several ways, such as by better γ or other detectors 
and better data processing to reduce the false alarm rate. For example, this would 
enable multidirectional beams or even three-D imaging. Neutron detection also 
can be usefully combined with X-ray imaging, to improve the detection statistics.
In a deuterium-tritium neutron generator an alpha particle is produced in association 
with each neutron. 
D + T - > n + α
As a charged particle, the α may be located with a position-sensitive detector so 
that its direction of flight and time of emission may be measured.  The associated 
neutron has the same time of emission and its direction of flight may be inferred 
by conservation of momentum, adding spatial information to the elemental 
composition information obtained from the γ measurements.
As mentioned above, automatic monitoring of images is becoming feasible but, 
for the time being, a human operator monitoring the screen is still the norm. In 
most applications, it would be expected that a very large number of innocent 
items would pass the system for every item containing explosives. Threat Image 
Projection (TIP) is a method of ensuring that the operators remain alert for these 
very rare cases. At random intervals, the system displays an image of a threat-
object: a bomb, gun, knife, narcotics package etc. selected at random from a 
library. On seeing a threat-object on an image, the operator acknowledges it to the 
system e.g. by pressing a button. If the threat has been projected from the library, 
the system confirms this to the operator who then proceeds with the next item 
to inspect. If the threat is in a real image, not from the library, the system gives 
the alarm. If the operator fails to acknowledge a library threat image, the system 
also indicates this. For example, a supervisor could then instruct the operator to 
increase concentration, take a rest break, or whatever other action is deemed 
appropriate. 
3.3.2 
pulsed fasT/Thermal 
neuTron acTivaTion 
(pfTna)
3.3.3 
improvemenTs of
neuTron-based
Techniques
3.3.4 
associaTed parTicle 
imaGinG (api)
3.4 
ThreaT imaGe projec-
Tion
Explosive Detection Equipment
and Technology for
Border Security32
Explosive Detection Equipment
and Technology for
Border Security 33
4. CharaCteristiCs of explosiVes
Characteristics of explosives
Many different types of explosive exist and certain types may be more used by 
particular groups or at particular times, depending on availability, information 
etc. Currently, a particular danger is perceived from plastic and liquid explosives. 
The sources from which terrorists may acquire explosives are from the military, 
from industry and by making them themselves. Blocking terrorist acquisition of 
military and industrial explosives is dependent on the rigorous following of security 
procedures for storage, transport and use, including careful documentation. 
Technology, such as radio-frequency tracking devices, may also help. Prevention 
of illicit fabrication of explosives is currently a subject of significant attention. 
The main difficulties are that precursor materials are legitimately available and in 
widespread use, not only by industry but even as household chemicals, and recipes 
have been widely disseminated via the internet.
Energetic materials have several key characteristics (chemical, energetic, 
mechanical, etc.) In this section we will concentrate on two groups that have 
the biggest potential for illicit use, because of their mechanical characteristics: 
plastic and liquid explosives.
From the name of the group we can consider their main physical characteristics:
Plastic explosive is high explosive that has added plasticizing material that makes 
it soft and hand-malleable and may have the added benefit of making it usable 
over a wider temperature range than pure explosive.
Liquid explosive is energetic material that is in the liquid phase and has the 
advantage that it can be put in various containers of different shapes and sizes. 
Liquid explosives are attractive to terrorists because of the scope they offer for 
disguising a bomb as an innocent beverage or foodstuff. The materials themselves 
are not in general novel or unusual. Liquid explosives are widely used in mining 
and quarrying for example, as are slurry explosives, saturated aqueous solutions 
of oxidizers and/or fuels.  Nitroglycerin, one of oldest known high-explosives, is a 
liquid, as is nitroglycol, also known as ethylene glycol dinitrate (EGDN), a related 
compound with a lower freezing point. Nitroglycol was used in the March 11th 2004 
attack on the Atocha Railway Station in Madrid. 
NITROGLYCERIN
Chemical: Propane-1, 2, 3-triyl 
trinitrate (C3H5N3O9) 
Density: 1.13g/cm3
Mainly industrial
4.1 
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explosives
4.2 
indusTrial and 
miliTary explosives 
commonly used by 
TerrorisTs
Explosive Detection Equipment
and Technology for
Border Security34
NITROGLYCOL (EGDN) 
Ethane-1,2-diyl dinitrate 
C2H4N2O6
Density 1.49 g/cm3
Mainly industrial
RDX (cyclonite, hexogen)
Chemical: C3H6N6O6
Density   : 1.82g/cm3
Mainly military
PETN (Penthrite) 
Chemical: C (CH2ONO2)4
Density: 1.773 g/cm3
Both military and industrial
Mixtures of these explosives are important, one of the best known is Semtex:
 
              H                A
PETN - 49.8%        94.3%
RDX -     50 %          5.7%                                                                                             
(Dye, binder, Plasticizer)
AMMONIUM NITRATE(AN)
AN based explosives are ordinarily stable and are widely used by legitimate industry 
and also by the military. Terrorist use is usually in the form of a very large vehicle 
bomb. Pure AN is hard to initiate so it is usually mixed with other substances. 
A common mixture is  ANFO (Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil) . Others are AMONAL 
(mixed with aluminum powder), AMATOL(mixed with TNT)  and AN/nitromethane 
mixture.
Chemical:    NH4NO3
Density:   (bulk) 0.840 g/cm³ 
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Characteristics of explosives
Amongst the home-made explosives, of greatest concern are the peroxide 
explosives.  The best known is triacetone triperoxide, a substance relatively easily 
made from household chemicals. It cannot be detected by instruments designed 
to detect nitrogen because it does not contain any.  TATP has been identified in 
explosive devices in a number of cases involving jihadist terrorists. Richard Reid, 
who attempted to down American Airlines Flight 63 in December 2001 with a bomb 
concealed in his shoe, the device containing plastic explosive with a TATP trigger. 
Homemade peroxide explosives were used in the July 7th 2005 attacks in London and 
TATP was found at the terrorist base in the Vollsmose quarter of Odense raided in 
2006. Peroxide explosives are often dangerously unstable, and frequently kill their 
manufacturers or would-be users, so they are not used by industry, the military or 
financially-motivated criminals, but by fanatic terrorists, such as suicide bombers. 
The usual mode of terrorist use is man-carried, in rucksacks or belts.
TATP
Chemical:
C9 H18 O6
(trimer – triacetone triperoxide) 
C6 H12 O4
(dimer – diacetone diperoxide)
Density: 1.27 g/cm3   
Home made AN-based
Many terrorists attacks have employed homemade explosive mixtures based 
on fertilizer ammonium nitrate, notably Oklahoma City 1995, Omagh 1998 and 
Vollsmose-Odense 2006. Its particular threat is that it is readily and legitimately 
available in quantities of 100’s of kg. AN is of considerable importance in agriculture, 
for which purpose no alternative is known which is as cheap, effective and 
environmentally benign. The European Fertilizer Regulation (EC) No. 2003/2003 
restricts the concentration and forms in which AN can be sold, with a view to 
preventing accidental explosions. Voluntary control schemes also exist in some 
countries e.g. [20].
Gunpowders and similar mixtures
The other common class of home-made explosives is the oxidizing salt/fuel mixture 
type, which includes traditional gunpowder, based on potassium nitrate. Other 
oxidizers used are sodium chlorate and potassium chlorate and perchlorate. Although 
sometimes thought not as dangerous as the other substances listed here, this type 
of explosive has been used by terrorists in deadly attacks, including in Bali in 2002. 
Even when made by non-malicious amateur pyrotechnicians motivated by curiosity 
or entertainment, they can be dangerous. Accidents with them cause deaths in 
Europe each year.
Most of the liquid explosives are nitro compounds, organic compounds that contain 
one or more nitro groups NO2, They are often highly sensitive: various impurities or 
improper handling can easily trigger a violent exothermic decomposition. Several 
kinds of liquid explosives are in common use as liquid propellants, including as 
standard military grade propellants (Table 4). The danger from these explosives is 
that they are likely to be in their final state, stored ready to use in drums, so that 
there is no need for a thief to extract them from munitions, like other kinds of 
4.3 
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standard explosive.
NITROMETHANE
HE (TNT) equivalents: 100%
Chemical: CH3NO2
Density: 1.138 g/cm3
TETRANITROMETHANE
 HE (TNT) equivalents: 100%  
Chemical: C (NO2)4 
Density: 1.62294 g/cm3
Figure 21: 
Examples of liquid
and shaped plastic
explosives 
Table 4: 
Liquid propellant - 
Military use [13]
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Conventional liquid explosives are mostly molecular-based. Recently, the synthesis 
of three new families of heterocyclic-based ionic salts was undertaken and 
accomplished [16]. Three triazole systems, 1H-1,2,4-triazole, 4-amino-1,2,4-
triazole, and 1H-1,2,3-triazole, were used as proton bases with nitric (HNO3), 
perchloric (HClO4), and dinitramidic (HN(NO2)2) acid systems. In all cases, stable 
salts were recovered and fully characterized by vibrational spectra (IR, Raman), 
multinuclear NMR spectroscopy, material balance, density measurements, and 
elemental analyses, as well as DSC, TGA and initial safety testing (impact). Many 
of these salts have melting points well below 100 °C, yet high decomposition 
onsets, defining them as new, highly energetic members of the well known class of 
materials identified as ionic liquids. Additionally, the single crystal X-ray diffraction 
study of 1, 2, 4-triazolium perchlorate was investigated, revealing the expected 
structure.
4.4 
ionic liquids
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5. researCh & deVelopment finanCed 
    by the european Commission
The European Commission plan for its Seventh Framework Programme for research 
and technological Development (FP7) aims at Collaborative Research, based around 
broad research themes, rather than instruments, with much continuity from FP6 as 
well as the addition of two new topics, space and security.
The “European Security Research Advisory Board” (ESRAB) published in Sep. 2006 
the European Security Research Agenda. Some key points from its summary are:
 “Detection and identification capabilities represent a key area for EU investment 
over the coming years. A broad range of application as, detection of unattended 
luggage in open areas and the detection of dangerous goods (drugs, explosives 
and CBRN) where existing technologies are generally too bulky, too slow, and 
generate unacceptably high false alarm rates. Complementary capabilities, to be 
developed in parallel, relate to improving the identification and authentication of 
cooperative, or non-cooperative, individuals.”
“Finally detection, identification and authentication capabilities need to be 
supported by appropriate localization and tracking capabilities for individuals and 
goods for a comprehensive approach towards potential threats.”[11]
“Numerous independent but interrelated systems must be integrated and then 
demonstrated to prove operational effectiveness. In areas of significant European 
interest, it is recommended that demonstration programmers be established to act 
as federative frames to coalesce the required research.”
ESRAB recommended five such programs:
Aftermath crisis management;• 
European-wide integrated border control system;• 
Logistic and supply chain security, goods screening;• 
Security of mass transportation;• 
CBRNE  - detection and identify of agents and devices. • 
 
ESRAB’s analysis of the Border Security question focuses on technologies and 
capabilities to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of all systems, equipment, 
tools and processes required for improving the security of Europe’s land and coastal 
borders, including border control and surveillance issues.
The JRC’s Border Security (BORSEC) Action includes as a topic work on capabilities 
in explosives and CBRN detection.
The work program for FP7 Theme 10 “security” published on 22.12.2006 includes 
most of the topics discussed.
In the year 2004 the EU launched the Preparatory Action on “Enhancement of 
the European Industrial Potential in the Field of Security Research 2004-2006” 
(PASR) which constitutes the Commission’s contribution to the  wider EU agenda 
5.1 
inTroducTion
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for addressing key security challenges facing Europe today. It focused in particular 
on the development of a security research agenda to bridge the gap between 
civil research ,as supported by EU framework programs, and national and inter-
governmental security research initiatives . Security research from the year 2007, 
however, is supported by FP7.
During 2004-2006 there were three calls that in total cost 45 M€  to fund about 40 
projects with the following defined  priorities:
“Improving situation awareness” (shorthand for surveillance and intelligence • 
gathering);
“Optimizing security and protection of networked systems”;• 
“Protecting against terrorism”;• 
“Enhancing crisis management”; and• 
“achieving interoperability and integrated systems for information and • 
communication” (shorthand for linking national and international law 
enforcement databases and information systems).
Synopses of each of the PASR projects may be downloaded from the Directorate 
General for Enterprise website at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/security/
documents_en.htm
We collect here the projects that related to identification and explosive detection
Previous Framework Programmes have also funded research and development 
projects on explosives detection, some of which we list overleaf. As well as projects 
intended to serve anti-terrorism and anti-organized-crime security applications, 
there were others directed towards post-conflict humanitarian needs, such as 
landmine and unexploded ordnance detection.
A searchable database of Framework Programme projects is publicly available on 
the EC’s Community Research and Development Information Service (http://cordis.
europa.eu) where more details may be found.
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Table 5: 
European Commis-
sion funded projects 
relating to explosive 
detection: 
Preparatory Action 
on Security Research 
(PASR 2004 and 2005 
and 2006)
CALL PROJECT PROJECT ID CONTACT START
PASR 
2004
TERASEC
Active Terahertz Imaging For 
Security
G.A. SEC4-
PR-004000
Dr. Heinz-Wilhelm Hübers 
Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und 
Raumfahrt e. V. 
Heinz-Wilhelm.Huebers@dlr.de
2005
PASR 
2004
ESSTRT
European Security: High Level Study 
On Threats Responses and Relevant 
Technologies
G.A. SEC4- 
SA-003200
Peter Munday 
Thales Research and Technology Ltd 
peter.munday@thalesgroup.com
2004
PASR 
2004
IMPACT
Innovative Measures For Protection 
Against CBRN Terrorism
G.A. SEC4-
PR-008000
Peter Van Hooft 
TNO Defence, Security and Safety 
hooft@pml.tno.nl
2004
PASR 
2005
PALMA
Protection Of Airliners Against 
Manpads Attacks
G.A. SEC5-
PR-110800
Gilles Fournier
gilles.fournier@eads.net
2006
PASR 
2005
PATIN
Protection Of Air Transportation And 
Infrastructure
G.A. SEC5-
PR-110400
klaus.scheerer
EADS CCR DCR/STI/T 
Diehl BGT Defence
klaus.scheerer@diehl-bgt-defence.de
2006
PASR 
2005
PRISE
Privacy Enhancing Shaping Of Security 
Research And Technology –  
A Participatory Approach To Develop 
Acceptable And Accepted Principles For 
European Security Industries And Policies
G.A. SEC5- 
SA-108600
Johann Čas 
Austrian Academy of Sciences
jcas@oeaw.ac.at
2006
PASR 
2005
SECCONDD 
Secure Container Data Device 
Standardisation
G.A. SEC5- 
SA-105100
Michael Naylor
Thales Research and Technology 
Ltd. UK
mike.naylor@thalesgroup.com
2006
PASR 
2005
SOBCAH 
Surveillance of Border Coastlines 
and Harbours
G.A.SEC5- 
PR-102100
Mario Audenino 
Galileo Avionica SpA
mario.audenino@galileoavionica.it
2006
PASR 
2006
ISOTREX 
Integrated system for on-line trace 
explosive detection in solid and 
vapour state
G.A. SEC6-
PR-203600
Antonio Palucci
ENEA Italy
palucci@frascati.enea.it
2007
PASR 
2006
STABORSEC 
Standards for Border Security
G.A. SEC6- 
SA-210900
Nicolas Delvaux
Sagem Défense Sécurité
nicolas.delvaux@sagem.com
2007
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CALL PROJECT PROJECT ID CONTACT START
FP7 IMSK - Integrated Mobile Security Kit SEC-2007-
218038
Saab AB SWEDEN 2008
FP7 EFFISEC - Efficient Integrated Security 
Checkpoints
SEC-2007- 
217991
Sagem Défense Sécurité, 
FRANCE
2008
FP7 CREATIF - CBRNE Related Testing and 
Certification Facilities
SEC-2007-
217922
Dr F Strebl, Austrian 
Research Centres
2008
FP7 STRAW – Security Technology Active Watch SEC-2007-
218132
Atos Origin SA
SPAIN
2008
FP7 UNCOSS – Underwater Coastal Sea Surveyor SEC-2007-
218148
CEA, FRANCE 2008
FP7 LOTUS – Location of Threat Substances in 
Urban Society
SEC-2007-
217925
Swedish Defence 
Research Agency
2008
FP7 OPTIX – Optical Technologies for the 
Identification of Explosives
SEC-2007-
218037
Indra Sistemas SA, SPAIN 2008
FP6 RESCUER - Improvement Of The Emergency 
Risk Management Through
Secure Mobile Mechatronic
Support To Bomb Disposal
IST-2002-
511492
Gusztáv Arz
Budapest University of
Technology and 
Economics
2004
FP6 VERTIGO - Versatile Two Micron Light Source IST-2005- 
034692
Marcel Rattunde
Fraunhofer Gesellschaft 
Zur Foerderung Der 
Angewandten Forschung 
E.V.
2006
FP6 TERANOVA - Novel Terahertz Sensing and 
Imaging Systems for Biotechnology, Healthcare, 
Security and Process Monitoring
IST-2002-
511415
Giles Davis
University of Leeds
2004
FP6 EURITRACK - European Illlicit Trafficking 
Countermeasures Kit
IST-2002-
511471
Jean-Louis Szabo
CEA Saclay
2004
FP6 DETEX - Development of a “Tandem” 
chemosensor system based on both highly 
selective and highly sensitive innovative 
materials: Application to ultra-trace detection 
of Explosives
NMP-2002-
505908
Céline Fiorini
CEA Saclay
2004
FP6 GOSPEL - European Network of Excellence in 
Artificial Olfaction
IST-2002-
507610
Udo Weimar
University of Tübingen
2002
FP5 EXPLO-NOSE - Multi-technique control system 
for the detection of hidden explosives
G6ST-
CT-2001-
50066
Sergio Cantino C.M.C. 
Consulenze Metallurgiche 
E Controlli S.R.L.
2001
FP5 NUPULSE - A non-destructive pulse 
neutron multiple detector tool for use in 
environmental, hydrocarbon and mineral 
exploration work
G1RD-
CT-2002-
00714
Raimo Matikainen
Geological Survey of 
Finland
2002
FP5 BioSens - Vapour dEtEctION - Area reduction in 
demining
IST-2000-
25348
Stephen Crabbe
Statens Raeddningsverk
2001
FP5 NOSE II - Second Network on Artificial Olfactory 
Sensing
IST-2001-
32494
Udo Weimar, Mika 
Harbeck
University of Tübingen
2001
FP4 NOSE - Artificial olfaction - development of 
sensors, arrays and olfactory imaging systems
ESPRIT 
29526
Wolfgang Göpel
University of Tübingen
1999
FP4 Searcher - an instrument to detect and identify 
organic substances in inaccessible places
SMT 
4965012
John Francis Caunt
John Caunt Scientific Ltd.
1996
FP4 TINA - Detection And Location Of Concealed 
Plastic Explosive In On-Line Baggages Screening 
By Tomographic Interrogation By Neutron 
Assaying
IN30937I Peter Choi
X-Technologies Ecole 
Polytechnique
FP4 FLEXSECURE - Modular, scalable detection 
system for explosives, drugs and weapons in 
hand baggage and medium sized parcels 
Project Acronym
ESPRIT 
23480
Rainer Henkel
Heimann Systems
1997
Table 6:
European Commission 
funded projects relating 
to explosive detection: 
FP4, 5, 6 & 7 
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6.  european legislation and poliCy ConCerning    
explosiVes and eds
Explosives and equipment connected with them are the subject of several 
European laws and policies.  Much of the acquis communautaire  in this area is not 
concerned with malicious use but pertains to safety and regulation of trade. This 
reflects the fact that security lay outside the jurisdiction of the EU institutions 
until the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and 
Home Affairs Pillars under the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. New policy initiatives in 
explosives security have been undertaken in this field over the last few years which 
are focused much more on prevention of terrorist and criminal use.
Council Directive 769/1976 (EEC) established a framework for harmonizing 
legislation concerning dangerous substances across the member states. It has been 
repeatedly amended and consolidated to address more substances, mainly toxic 
and flammable substances. At present, explosives are not covered by it but an 
amendment to cover ammonium nitrate is currently being considered. 
Council Directive 93/15/EEC (on the harmonization of the provisions on the placing 
on the market and supervision of explosives for civil uses) is concerned with safety 
requirements for explosives and security controls on their transfer. Following on 
from this, Commission Directive 2008/43/EC provides for setting up a system for 
identification and traceability
In March 2008, the old European Aviation Security law, Regulation (EC) 2320/2002 
of the Parliament and Council, was repealed and replaced by Parliament/Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 300/2008. It constitutes the EU’s interpretation of Annex 
17 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, which is the basic 
instrument of international law in this field. A key change concerning explosives 
detection is that the new Regulation allows Hold Baggage not to be re-screened 
when it has arrived from another Member State or from a country outside the EU 
which has equivalent security standards.  
Unlike the old Regulation, the new Regulation does not go into any detail concerning 
equipment, stating simply that “Equipment used for screening, access control and 
other security controls shall comply with the defined specifications and be capable 
of performing the security controls concerned”, and there is no Annex stating 
prohibited items. The purpose of this change is to avoid the need to go through a 
lengthy political process if any updates are required for purely technical reasons.
Some details are currently covered by Commission Regulations as tabulated below. 
Several of these include technical Annexes which are classified Secret. Their general 
topics are public, being stated in the Implementation Reports COM(2005)428 and 
COM(2007)542. Under the new regime of Regulation 300/2008, it is intended that these 
measures will be repealed and replaced Commission Decisions. These need not be 
published in the Official Journal, eliminating the need for a separate Secret Annex.
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COMMISSION
REGULATION SUBJECT
622/2003 Implementation measures, Annex with details of prohibited articles
1217/2003 Common specifications for national civil aviation security quality control programs.
1486/2003 Procedures for Commission inspections
68/2004 Amends Annex of 622 on prohibited articles
1138/2004 Definition of security restricted areas of airports, Screening of staff
781/2005 Amends Annex of 622, performance standards for X-ray machines
857/2005 Amends Annex of 622, hand search of passengers
65/2006 Procedures for evaluation and introduction of new technical methods and processes
240/2006 Amends Annex of 622, vehicles entering secure area
831/2006 Amends Annex of 622,  rules on air cargo security
1448/2006 Amends Annex of 622,  performance standards for EDS
1546/2006 Amends Annex to 622,  adds restrictions on liquids [23]
1862/2006 Amends Annex to 622, performance standards for walk through metal detectors
358/2008 Amends Annex to 622, removes restrictions on cabin bag size
Regulation (EC ) No. 725/2004 of the European Parliament and Council is aimed at 
enhancing the security of ships used in international trade and domestic shipping 
and associated port facilities. It provides a basis for the harmonized interpretation 
and implementation and Community monitoring of the International Maritime 
Organisation’s Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention and International Ship and 
Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.  SOLAS includes a requirement to prevent the 
introduction of unauthorized weapons, incendiary devices or explosives to ships 
or port facilities and also to conduct assessments of the effect of explosives on 
ship and port structures. Ports covered by ISPS must have a Port Facility Security 
Plan which should include the use of scanning/detection equipment, mechanical 
devices or dogs, with training drills for staff.  Directive 2005/65/EC places a duty 
on Member States to identify specific requirements for dealing with established 
security concerns, such as ‘suspect’ cargo, luggage, bunker, provisions or persons, 
unknown parcels and known dangers (e.g. bombs) when conducting the Port 
Security Assessments required  by ISPS. 
The Fertilizer Regulation (EC) 2003/2003 of the Parliament and Council contains 
provisions regarding explosive hazards concern the risk of accidental explosions, 
rather than terrorist acts. It defines test methods in detail.
Council Directive (EC) 96/1982 concerns safety of fixed installations storing large 
quantities of dangerous substances. 
Recommendations covering the transport of dangerous goods, including hazardous 
wastes and substances, are issued and regularly revised by the Committee of 
Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods of the United Nations Economic and 
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Social Council which has its secretariat in the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe (UNECE). These recommendations serve as the basis for many national 
regulations a well as for international instruments covering the transport of 
dangerous goods by sea, air, rail, road and inland waterways all over the world. 
Amongst these, those listed below have also been developed and are regularly 
updated by the UNECE. 
European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods 1. 
by Road ( ADR), of 30 September 1957 
Protocol amending article 1 (a), article 14 (1) and article 14 (3) (b) of the 2. 
European Agreement of 30 September 1957 concerning the International 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road ( ADR), of 28 October 1993 
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage caused during Carriage of Dangerous 3. 
Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels ( CRTD), of 10 October 
1989 
European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods 4. 
by Inland Waterway ( ADN), of 25 May 2000
ADR requires that dangerous goods, including specifically explosives, which are 
transported by road are packaged and labeled in an agreed manner and the vehicles 
satisfy certain rules regarding their construction, equipment and operation. ADR is 
applied inside the EU by Council Directive 94/55/EC, Directive 2000/61/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council and Commission Directive 2003/28/EC.
The Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail  (COTIF) has an Annex 
called the Regulations concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods 
by Rail (RID). RID was brought into force in the EU  through Directive 96/49 and 
updated every two years in line with updates of RID.  The latest was in 2007 
through Directive 2006/ 90. 
A new Framework Directive 2008/68/EC of September 2008 will simplify the 
structure for EU implementation of ADR, ADN and COTIF/RID.
Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) 2006/1907, Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals  Regulation  (REACH), is an extremely 
complex law which concerns production and use of chemical substances. Its purpose 
is to ensure a high level of human health and environmental protection. 
REACH requires explosive properties to be stated as standard information in 
documentation for any substance manufactured or imported in bulk.
In response to the Atocha Railway Station bombing the European Council issued 
a Declaration on Combatting Terrorism, to which was Annexed a revised Plan of 
Action with updated strategic objectives. In this statement the Council recognized 
the need to ensure greater security of firearms, explosives and bomb making 
equipment. 
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In COM(2004)698 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on Prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist 
attacks, the Commission stated that it was actively  pursuing these objectives with 
the research community, experts, the European Police organization EUROPOL and 
the explosives and detonator manufacturers. 
In the Communication from the Commission  on measures to ensure greater security 
in explosives, detonators, bomb-making equipment and fire-arms (COM(2005)329), 
the Commission described actual and planned measures and stated its will to 
engage in a structured dialogue with the private sector and its intention to set up 
an expert group.
The Commission organized a conference entitled Public-Private Security Dialogue: 
Detection Technologies and Associated Technologies in the Fight against Terrorism 
in Brussels in November 2005. The following September it issued COM(2006)474 
“Green Paper on detection technologies in the work of law enforcement, customs 
and other security authorities” which was presented in the form of questions, 
intended to elicit responses from public and private sector stakeholders.
The Commission, led by its Directorate General for Justice, Liberty and Security 
(DG JLS), duly established the expert group which it had earlier suggested during its 
security of explosives conference in January 2007. Around 100 experts representing 
the relevant public and private stake-holders participated in the ESETF under four 
working groups:
WG1 – Precursors
WG2 – Supply Chain
WG3 – Detection
WG4 – Public Security Aspects
ESETF’s findings were brought together in a report [22] which was released at a 
conference held in Braga, Portugal in July 2007. 
ESETF made 56 specific recommendations. In response, the Commission defined 
an Action Plan, which was submitted to the Council of the EU and the European 
Parliament.  The Justice and Home Affairs Council of 6th and 7th December 2007 
approved the Strategic Orientations and Priority Measures of the Action Plan and 
also designated within each of the areas “Prevention”, “Detection”, “Preparedness 
and Response” and “Horizontal Measures” certain measures as constituting 
priorities. Amongst these priorities were two committees to be established: an 
ad hoc group on detection and a standing committee on precursor materials. The 
latter was convened for the first time on 30th January 2008. EUROPOL is setting up 
a database of known offences involving explosive use and another Council priority 
is the upgrading of this database to allow European government agencies secure 
access at all times.
PASR project STABORSEC revealed a need for further work on specification and 
certification standards for explosive detection equipment in Europe, since at 
present they are poorly developed. Two US standards were identified:
European legislation and policy concerning explosives and EDS
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ASTM F792-01e2
Standard Practice for Evaluating the Imaging Performance of Security X-Ray 
Systems
BSR N42.40-200x (DRAFT STANDARD)
Standard for Evaluation and Performance of High-Energy, X-Ray Interrogation 
Systems for Detection of Contraband of concern in Homeland Security
STABORSEC recommended that minimal detection thresholds and classification be 
agreed amongst member states. For EDS in airports, this has already been addressed 
by Commission Regulation 1448/2006 (see above), but it does not apply to land or 
maritime borders. Moreover, even for aviation there is no standardized protocol for 
test and evaluation. Each laboratory has different methods of assessing whether 
the instrument has achieved the statutory performance requirements, and they 
may give conflicting answers. 
STABORSEC also recommended making specifications for data format and image 
quality to facilitate exchange of X-ray etc. images of bombs amongst States.
JRC is currently maintaining the website http://staborsec.jrc.it  where the 
STABORSEC reports (“Deliverables”) may be downloaded and the recommendations 
read in full.
European legislation and policy concerning explosives and EDS
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7. glossary
Bulk explosives-detection equipment
Any explosives detection device or system that remotely senses some physical or 
chemical property of an object under investigation to determine if it is an explo-
sive.
CBRN
Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear, used to describe a weapon or 
threat
EDS
Explosive detection system is a means of detecting the presence of explosives, 
in either trace or bulk quantities, typically employing some combination of elec-
tronic sensors, software and/or chemical reagents. Sniffer dogs or other animals 
may also be considered part of an EDS.
Fast neutrons
Have energy greater than 1 eV, 0.1 MeV or approximately 1 MeV, depending on the 
definition. 
FNA
Fast Neutron Analysis.
Ion mobility spectrometer (IMS)
A means to identify substances based on the different ability of molecular ions to 
move through a low pressure gas. IMS utilizes the following four steps (1) vaporize 
the sample, (2)  ionize the vapor (place an electric charge on sample molecules), 
(3) accelerate the ions using an electric field (4) pass the ions through a drift space 
filled with low pressure gas and determine the number of separated ions arriving 
after different time intervals.   The pattern of separation is compared to a library 
of known patterns to identify the substance collected.
Mass spectrometry (MS)
A means to identify substances based on charge-to-mass ratio. MS utilizes four 
steps: (1) vaporize the sample, (2) ionize the vapor  (3) separate the ions using an 
electric or magnetic field, and (4) determine the number of separated ions hav-
ing a particular charge-to-mass ratio. The uniqueness of mass spectrometry lies 
in its chemical specificity. It directly measures a fundamental property of the tar-
get molecule—its molecular weight—and thus provides a highly specific means of 
identifying the molecule. Some forms of MS use a more energetic ionization which 
breaks the molecules so that fragments may also be seen. MS has inherently better 
specificity than IMS, since different molecules may have similar IMS drift times.
Nuclear magnetic resonance
A bulk explosives detection technique based on the magnetic properties of the 
hydrogen atoms within the explosive being detected. 
Nuclear quadrupole resonance
Induces nuclei of specific atoms to store RF energy for a short time.
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Particulate
Refers to microscopic particles of solid material that adhere (contaminate) to sur-
faces That have, directly or indirectly, come into contact with an explosive mate-
rial.
Plastic explosives
Are high-explosive materials that have the general consistency of plastic. They 
are usually based on RDX and/or PETN. Examples include C-4, Detasheet, and 
Semtex.
Pulsed fast neutron analysis
A nuclear-based screening technique that measures the elemental composition of 
the object being scanned through neutron interaction with elemental constituents 
of the object, resulting in characteristic gamma rays. 
Sensitivity
The ability of the detector to identify explosives if an explosive is present.
Slow neutrons
Have energy less than 1 eV. 
Specificity
The ability of the detector to identify explosives only if an explosive is present.
Thermal neutrons
Have an average energy of about 0.025 eV. 
Time-of-flight	(TOF)	mass	spectrometer
Ionized sample molecules in a vacuum are accelerated in a straight line so that 
they fly down an evacuated tube. By measuring how long the ions take to reach a 
detector at a fixed position and by taking into account the length of the flight, one 
can determine the mass-to-charge ratio and the number of ions detected at each 
sequential mass.
Trace explosive
Detection consists in the chemical identification of microscopic residues of the 
explosive compound, either in vapor or in particulate form. Vapor refers to the 
gas-phase molecules emitted from the explosive’s surface (solid or liquid) because 
of its finite vapor pressure.
Validation
Confirmation that the specified requirements (for an explosives-detection system) 
satisfy stakeholder needs.
Vapor pressure
All solids and liquids emit a certain amount of vapor (usually have correlation 
with temperature) and that the pressure of the gas phase above them. Sometime 
expressed as relative concentrations in saturated air, rather than in true pressure 
units, and are usually expressed in units of ppm (parts per million: 1:106 , cor-
responding to one molecule per one million air molecules), ppb (parts per billion, 
1:109), or ppt (parts per trillion, 1:1012 ).
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ANFO Ammonium Nitrate in Fuel Oil
CARS Coherent anti-Stokes Raman spectroscopy
DIAL Differential Absorption Light Direction and Ranging
DIRL Differential reflectance LIDAR
DMDB Dimethylnitrobenzene
DNT Dinitrotoluene
ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference
EDS Explosive detection system
EGDN Ethylene glycol dinitrate (also called nitroglycol)
ETD Explosive traces detectors
HMX High Molecular weight RDX – a name for cyclotetramethylenetetran
itramine (acronym sometimes explained as Her Majesty’s Explosive, 
High Melting Point Explosive etc.) 
IMS Ion Mobility Spectrometer
LIDAR Light Direction and Ranging
LIBS Laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy
MMW Millimeter Wave
NG Nitroglycerine
NT Nitrotoluene
PETN Pentaerythritol tetranitrate
PFTNA Pulsed Fast Thermal Neutron Analysis
ppb Parts per billion
ppm Parts per million
ppt Parts per trillion
PS3 Personal Security Screening System
RDX Research Department Explosive – a name for 
cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine
SPF–FD Surface laser Photo Fragmentation - Fragment Detection
TATP Triacetone triperoxide
TNA Thermal Neutron Analysis
TNT Trinitrotoluene
TOF Time-of-flight
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9. appendixes
Table 7:
Some nitrogen-based 
high explosives and 
their compositions
Table 8:
Summary of physical 
and chemical proper-
ties of common explo-
sives [1] [6]
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Figure 22: 
Nitrogen density of 
common materials and 
explosives [10]
Figure 23: 
Vapor pressures of 
high explosives and 
additives. [4]
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Company Phone Number Web Address Address
Main  Equipment/
Technology/uses
3DX-RAY Ltd. +44 1664 
503600
www.3dx-ray.com Pera Innovation park, 
Nottingham Road 
Melton Mowbray, 
Leicestershire,LE13 
0PB UK
 X-Ray
(Hand carried package)
American Science 
and Engineering, Inc. 
(AS&E)
+1 978–262–
8700
www.as-e.com 829 Middlesex Turnpike 
Billerica, MA 01821, USA
X-Ray: Transmission 
& double sided Z 
backscatter
Autoclear +1 973–276–
6161
www.controlscreening.
com
2 Gardner Rd
Fairfield, NJ 07004, USA
X-Ray: Dual-Energy
(mail &fixed and mobile 
vehicle search and 
personal)
Bruker Daltonics +1 978–663–
3660
+49 (421) 
2205-0
www.bdal.com 40 Manning Rd • 
Billerica MA 01821, USA
Fahrenheitstr. 4• 
D-28359 Bremen FRG
TNA
Delta X-ray +1 703–820–
5204
www.delta-xray.com 2111 Wilson Blvd, Suite 
700 Arlington, VA 22201 
USA
X-Ray: Portable (limited 
for personal)
G E Security
(inc. former InVision 
and Quantum 
Magnetics)
+1-888-437-
3287
www.gesecurity.com 8985 Town Center 
Parkway Bradenton, 
FL -34202-5129 USA
X-Ray (CT and XRD),
NQR (Baggage ,Hand 
carried package, shoes)
Gilardoni +39 0341 
705111
www.gilardoni.it Via Arturo Gilardoni 1, 
23826 Mandello Del 
Lario, Lecco ITALY
X-Ray (Baggage ,Hand 
carried package)
Golden Engineering Inc. +1 765–855–
3493
www.
goldenengineering.com
PO Box 185,Centerville, 
IN 47330 USA
X-Ray: Portable    
(limited for personal)
L3 Communications
Security & Detection
Systems
+1 781–939–
3800
www.dsxray.com 10E Commerce Way
Woburn, MA 01801, USA
X-Ray: Dual-Energy& 
Computed Tomography, 
millimeter wave  
(Packages, Baggage and 
hand carried ,Cargo& 
Vehicle (Mobile))
Logos Imaging +1 765–939–
4044
www.logosimaging.com P.O. Box 765 Richmond, 
IN 47375, USA
X-Ray: Portable (limited 
for personal)
Reveal Imaging +1 781-276-
8400
www.revealimaging.
com
201 Burlington Rd 
Bedford, MA 01730 USA
CT X-Ray, Baggage, and 
hand carried inc. larger 
bags, mobile 
Q R Sciences Ltd. +618 9351 1200 www.qrsciences.com 8-10 Hamilton street, 
Cannington WA 6107 
AUSTRALIA
X-Ray, NQR (Baggage, 
Hand carried package)
Rapiscan Systems +1 310–978–
1457
+44 (0)870-
7774301
www.rapiscan.com 2805 Columbia St. 
Torrance CA 90503, USA
X-Ray House Bonehurst 
Road, Salfords Surrey 
RH1 5GG UK
X-Ray: single energy 
Dual-Energy & Diffraction 
and high energy 
(Packages, Baggage, 
and hand carried ,Cargo 
Container  and Vehicle)
Science Application
International 
Corporation (SAIC)
+1 800–962–
1632
+1 866-723-
8726
www.saic.com/
products/security
Security & Transportation
Technology
10260 Campus Point 
Drive, San Diego, CA 
92121, USA
X-Ray: Portable (limited 
for personal).
Gamma ray: Vehicle, 
Cargo
SAS R&D Services 954–432–2345 www.sasrad.com 2714 SW 183rd Ave.
Miramar, FL 33029, USA
Gamma Backscatter
(Baggage, Handheld)
Scanna MSC Ltd +44 20 7355 
3555
www.scanna-msc.com 223 Regent Street, 
London W1B 2EB, UK
X-Ray Portable (limited 
for personal)
Smiths Detection • 
(inc. former 
Barringer, ETG, 
Graseby)
Smiths Heimann • 
GmbH.
+44 (0)1923 
294400
 
+49 611 9412 0
www.smithsdetection.
com
 
www.smith-heimann.
com
459 Park Avenue Bushey 
Herts.
WD23 2BW UK
Im Herzen 4
65205 Wiesbaden, FRG
X-Ray: Dual-Energy
(Hand carried package, 
Cargo& Palletized Cargo 
and Vehicle)
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*   A detector types
    CL: chemiluminescence 
    DMS: differential ion mobility spectrometry
    GC: gas chromatography
    IMS: ion mobility spectrometry
    ITMS: ion trap ion mobility spectrometry
    MS: mass spectrometry
    NDLM: non linear dependence of ion mobility
    SAW: surface acoustic wave 
    TR: thermo-redox
Company Phone Number Web Address Address Detector types*
Biosensor 
Applications 
Sweden AB
+46 (0) 8 706 
75 00
www.biosensor.se Solna Strandväg 3
SE-171 54 Solna
SWEDEN
Immunological/
micromechanical
Bruker Daltonics +1 978–663–3660
+49 421 2205-0
www.bdal.com 40 Manning Rd • 
Billerica MA 01821, 
USA
Fahrenheitstr. 4 • 
D-28359 Bremen FRG
GC/MS
CDEX Inc +1 520-745-5172 www.cdex-inc.com CDEX, Inc., 4555 S. Palo 
Verde, Suite 123
Tucson, AZ 85714, USA
UV fluorescence
Constellation 
Technology
Corporation
+1 727–547–0600 www.contech.com 7887 Bryan Dairy Road 
Largo, FL 33777-1452, 
USA
GC/MS
Electronic Sensor
Technology
+1 805–480–1994 www.estcal.com 1077 Business Center 
Circle, Newbury Park, 
CA 91320, USA
GC/SAW
GE Security
(formerly GE Ion 
Track)
+1 978–658–3767 www.gesecurity.com 205 Lowell Street
Wilmington, MA 01887, 
USA
ITMS (IMS based)
Mass Spec 
Analytical Ltd
+44 117 3173600 www.msaltd.co.uk Building 20F
Golf Course Lane, PO 
Box 77, Filton, Bristol 
BS99 7AR, UK
Portable tandem MS
Mistral Security 
Inc 
+1 301–913–9368 www.mistralgroup.
com
7910 Woodmont Ave, 
Suite 820, Bethesda, 
MD 20814, USA
Color
Scintrex Trace 
Corp. (subsidiary 
of Autoclear)
+1 613–224–1061 www.scintrextrace.
com
300 Parkdale Ave.
Ottawa, Ontario, 
Canada K1Y 1G2
CL, TR, GC-IMS/CL
Smiths Detection 
(inc. former 
Barringer, ETG, 
Graseby)
+44 1923 294400 www.smithsdetection.
com
459 Park Avenue
Bushey Herts.
WD23 2BW UK
IMS
Thermo Scientific
(formerly Thermo 
Electron)
+1 203 605 2534 www.thermo.com/
security
148 Old Gate Lane
Milford CT 06460, USA
GC/DMS (IMS based)
Table 10:
Vendor List for Com-
mercially Available 
Trace ExplosivesDe-
tection  Technologies
(Used for Personnel, 
package, and vehicle 
search)
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Abstract
This report contains a brief survey of Explosives Detection Technology, as it is 
applied for inspection of goods and passengers at borders, and explains the role 
of European legislation and the European Commission’s research programs in this 
field. It describes the techniques of trace and bulk explosives detection that are 
in use, the latest techniques that are in development and the characteristics of 
explosives that are, or might be, used to provide a signature for exploitation in 
detection technology. References to academic reviews are included for those 
wishing to study the subject in greater depth. Some additional details are given 
concerning plastic and liquid explosives, which are a threat of particular current 
importance. The report also contains a brief account of relevant European 
trade, safety and security legislation, a description of recent policy initiatives 
and tables of related European Commission funded research projects. Contact 
details of commercial companies selling explosive detection products are also 
provided.
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